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His cousins arrive in the capital. An uncle reminds him that he is“ a son of the land.” Very quickly, a phrase emerges:— Now that our brother is up there, our people need to benefit from it. A recent college graduate asks him for a job.— What’ s your background?— It doesn’ t matter, big brother. Even an administrative position would do. A businessman wants a contract. A local elected official wants Emmanuel to get his nephew appointed. A traditional chief reminds him that the village supported him. Soon, Emmanuel understands the unspoken rule: if he strictly follows procedures, some of his relatives will say he’ s forgotten his own people. But if he bypasses procedures, he’ ll be contributing to the very system that once prevented people like him from getting ahead. That’ s the trap. The individual who enters government is no longer seen merely as a servant of the institution. In the eyes of his community, he can become the representative of a right to access public resources. The position no longer belongs entirely to the state. It belongs partly to the family. Partly to the village.
Partly to the region.
Partly to the network that helped facilitate the rise to power. This is the classic mechanism of clientelism: access to resources depends more on personal connections than on universal rules. Research on developing states and economies has long described how patronage, nepotism, and interpersonal loyalties can compete with impersonal administrative rules. But here again, we must avoid oversimplification: African voters do not automatically behave like clients waiting for handouts. A study of Kenya and Zambia, for example, showed that the voters observed seemed to place greater importance on certain local public goods than on simply receiving individual favors. The problem, therefore, is not a supposed“ African mentality.” The problem is the system of incentives that emerges when institutions become less reliable than personal relationships.
Flashmag! Edition 176 Septembre 2026
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