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A fragmented memory and the attribution of conflicts to administrations
Flashmag! Issue 162 July 2025
In the United States, it is common to attribute the outbreak and consequences of wars to specific presidential figures, rather than to a shared national responsibility( Martha McHardy, 2025). The Vietnam War, for example, is often associated with President Kennedy, despite the progressive escalation of American involvement over twenty years, from 1955 to 1975. As early as 1962, the American ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, warned President Kennedy of a“ growing military commitment” in Vietnam, fearing that it would develop into a“ major, prolonged and indecisive military involvement”. Historians continue to debate whether Kennedy would have followed the same course as Lyndon Johnson, even though the first stages of escalation took place under his presidency. The U. S. force grew from 23,000 in 1964 to 185,000 in 1965, with the first bombing raids on North Vietnam decided in February 1965. This conflict, which cost the lives of nearly 60,000 Americans and over a million Vietnamese, provoked strong internal protest and prompted American citizens to question the moral principles of their foreign policy and military actions. Similarly, the war in Iraq is frequently attributed to the Bush administration, illustrating this tendency to personalize conflicts. This fragmentation of memory prevents a true collective awareness of the human and societal costs of military intervention, preventing the nation from fully integrating these experiences into its collective history and drawing lasting lessons for the future. Paradoxically, in countries often labeled as autocrats by Western doxa, decisions to go to war are more carefully considered. This is a far cry from Barack Obama’ s bombing of Libya after the umpteenth sham at the United Nations, or Donald Trump’ s unilateral decision to bomb Iran without consulting the US Congress or a UN Security Council resolution.
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